Beyond the Schoolhouse Gates and into the Virtual Playground: Moderating Student Cyberbullying and Cyberharassment after Morse v. Frederick by Moy, Jessica
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 37
Number 3 Spring 2010 Article 4
1-1-2010
Beyond the Schoolhouse Gates and into the Virtual
Playground: Moderating Student Cyberbullying
and Cyberharassment after Morse v. Frederick
Jessica Moy
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jessica Moy, Beyond the Schoolhouse Gates and into the Virtual Playground: Moderating Student Cyberbullying and Cyberharassment after
Morse v. Frederick, 37 Hastings Const. L.Q. 565 (2010).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol37/iss3/4
Beyond 'The Schoolhouse Gates' and into the
Virtual Playground: Moderating Student
Cyberbullying and Cyberharassment After
Morse v. Frederick
by JESSICA MOY*
In constructing and maintaining a system of freedom of
expression.... [t]he crucial issues have revolved around the
question of what limitations, if any, ought to be imposed upon
freedom of expression in order to reconcile that interest with
other individual and social interests sought by the good society.
-Thomas I. Emerson1
Introduction
"Cyberbullying has become increasingly.., prevalent as today's
adolescents grow up with a savvy understanding of technology and
base a significant portion of their social lives around Internet
interactions with their social groups."2 A recent survey concluded
that "[n]early a third of online teens say they have been harassed on
the internet," including being sent "threatening or aggressive
* Juris Doctor Candidate 2010, University of California, Hastings College of the
Law. I'd like to thank Professor David Faigman who offered thoughtful suggestions for
structuring and improving the arguments in this Note throughout the drafting process.
1. Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE
L.J. 877, 887 (1963).
2. Stacy M. Chaffin, Comment, The New Playground Bullies of Cyberspace: Online
Peer Sexual Harassment, 51 HOW. L.J. 773, 775 (Spring 2008); see also Bill Belsey,
Cyberbullying: An Emerging Threat to the "Always On" Generation (2005), http://www.
cyberbullying.ca/pdf/CyberbullyingArticle-byBill-Belsey.pdf.
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messages. '3 These newly minted "cyberbullies" use the Internet to
send or post hurtful messages or images and exploit technology to
control and intimidate others on school campuses.
Bullying is a powerful tool of oppression during middle school
and high school years, when children form groups or cliques based on
a commonality of interests, values, abilities, and tastes in order to gain
acceptance and a sense of security! Belonging to and identifying with
a group is a healthy step towards self-realization, but the same system
of group identification creates a culture that nurtures discrimination
through exclusivity and exclusion.6 According to a 2007 study by the
Federal Probation Juvenile Department, "90 percent of middle-
school students have had their feelings hurt online," while "75
percent have visited a [website that bashed] another student."7
Cyberbullies also target teachers or school administrators with
disparaging, defamatory, or threatening comments on the Internet.
Instances when an adult is the target of this behavior are known as
"cyberharassment." 8
Bullying is defined as a "conscious, willful, and deliberate hostile
activity intended to harm, induce fear through the threat of further
aggression, and create terror," and usually involves three elements: an
imbalance of power, intent to harm, and threats of further
aggression.9 "Cyberbullying" is a term describing "use of the
[i]nternet, cell phones, or other technology to send or post text or
images intended to hurt or embarrass another person."' "In
whatever form bullying occurs, the victim always experiences a
pattern of humiliation, abuse, and fear."" "A bully's actions are
3. Associated Press, One-Third of Online Teens Bullied, Study Finds, CNN.COM,
June 28, 2007, available at http://www.cnn.comI2007ITECHiinternet/06/28/cyber.bully.ap/
index.html.
4. Belsey, supra note 2, at 3-4.
5. Chaffin, supra note 2, at 778; see also BARBARA COLOROSO, THE BULLY, THE
BULLIED, AND THE BYSTANDER: FROM PRESCHOOL TO HIGH SCHOOL-How PARENTS
AND TEACHERS CAN HELP BREAK THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE 13,26 (2003).
6. COLOROSO, supra note 5, at 26.
7. Alvin W. Cohn, Juvenile Focus, 71 FED. PROBATION 44, 50 (2007).
8. Stopcyberbullying.org, What is Cyberbullying, Exactly?, http://www.stopcyberbully
ing.org/whatiscyberbullyingexactlyhtm (last visited Sept. 15,2008).
9. COLOROSO, supra note 5, at 13-14.
10. Janis Wolak et. al., Does Online Harassment Constitute Bullying? An Exploration
of Online Harassment by Known Peers and Online-Only Contacts, 41 J. Adolescent Heath
S51, S51-52 (2007) (citation omitted).
11. Stacy M. Chaffin, Comment, The New Playground Bullies of Cyberspace: Online
Peer Sexual Harassment, 51 HOw. L.J. 773, 777 (Spring 2008).
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intentional, never accidental; instead, they are directed attacks
against a specific victim." 2
Unlike traditional school-yard bullies, the intimidation tactics of
cyberbullies have limitless reach because they possess the ability to
humiliate and harass their peers with a click of a button, thereby
disseminating hurtful untruths to a wide audience.13 Consequently,
cyberbullying results in a greater impact than traditional bullying
because Internet content is widely distributed and more public than
traditional bullying. Constant harassment made possible by a website
compounds the invasion of privacy and the impact of bullying.'
Additionally, the Internet cloaks a cyberbully in anonymity and
provides a sense of detachment from his or her victim.15 This, in
combination with the belief that they are beyond the legal reach of
schools because harassment occurs outside of "the schoolhouse
gates,"'6 emboldens bullies to victimize in particularly cruel, and often
psychologically damaging, ways.
Victimization over the Internet can precipitate grave
consequences during the vulnerable and volatile adolescent years.
For example, 13-year-old Ryan Patrick Halligan took his own life as a
result of cyberbullying by his peers at school. Ryan's school-yard
bully made him a victim of online bullying by taking a funny story out
of context and spreading a rumor that Ryan was gay throughout the
entire school via instant messaging ("IM") and chat rooms.18
Additionally, a popular girl at school convinced Ryan that she liked
him through a series of IMs and subsequently shared the details of
her online conversations with others at school to humiliate and
embarrass Ryan.'9 Later, the girl told Ryan that she would never
want anything to do with such a "loser." 20 In response, Ryan said that
12. Id.
13. Id. at 817.
14. Sandy Coleman, Battling the Web's Dark Side: Schools Balance Student Rights,
Rules in Incidents on Net, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 27, 2000, at BI.
15. Francoise Gilbert & Brad Laybourne, Anonymity on the Internet Legal Aspects,
823 PLI/Pat 205, 214-18 (2005).
16. Stopcyberbullying.com, supra note 8.
17. John Halligan, Ryan's Story: In Memory of Ryan Patrick Halligan 1989-2003,
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"it was girls like her that made him want to kill himself," and he did
just that.2
A significant amount of student speech has become cyberspeech
due to the proliferation of social networking sites, such as MySpace
and Facebook, videos on YouTube, IM, and online blogs.22 In 2005,
87% of teenagers used the Internet, compared to 73% in 2000.'
3
Today, 65% to 75% of teenagers use social networking websites and
have online profiles.24 Victims of bullying experience a variety of
negative effects from psychological abuse, such as lowered self-
esteem, anxiety, decreased attentiveness, and lowered grades.2
Although most of the content produced by cyberbullying originates
outside the orbit of school campuses and on personal computers, "the
effects of such content can be felt every day within the schoolhouse
gates."26 In light of these developments, schools increasingly face the
issue of how to deal with online speech that takes place off of school
grounds.
"Harassing speech poses perhaps the most difficult challenge to
any argument limiting the power of schools to punish student
expression." 27  As illustrated above, cyberbullying and cyber-
harassment can cause serious psychological damage to students,
severely undermine their ability to learn and succeed in school, and at
21. Gretchen Voss, MeanKids.Com: The Internet is raising the stakes on traditional
bullying, often with devastating results. Is your kid at risk? http://www.bostonmagazine.com
/articles/meankidscom/ (last visited February 7, 2010).
22. Amanda Lenhart & Mary Madden, Teens, Privacy & Online Social Networks-
How teens manage their online identities and personal information in the age of MySpace,
PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT (2007), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/
pdfs/PIPTeens PrivacySNSReportFinal.pdf (last visited February 6, 2010).
23. Amanda Lenhart, Mary Madden & Paul Hitlin, Teen and Technology-Youth are
leading the transition to a fully wired and mobile nation, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE
PROJECT (2005), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/-/media//Files/Reports/2005/PIP
TeensTechJuly2005web.pdf.pdf.
24. Social network use by adult Americans on the rise survey. http://en.kioskea.net/
news/11805-social-network-use-by-adult-americans-on-the-rise-survey (2009) (last visited February
7,2010).
25. Kathleen Conn, Bullying, Harrassment, and Student Threats: Are Schools and The
Courts Working Together?, 203 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 1 (2005).
26. Todd D. Erb, A Case for Strengthening School District Jurisdiction to Punish Off-
Campus Incidents of Cyberbullying, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 257,258 (2008).
27. Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV.
1027, 1094 (2008); see also Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999)
(holding that a private action may lie against the school board in cases of student-on-
student harassment, but only for harassment that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively
offensive that it effectively bars the victim's access to an educational opportunity or
benefit).
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times lead to truancy, violence, and suicide.2 "Courts and
commentators disagree about when schools should have authority to
restrict harassing, intimidating, or otherwise hurtful speech even
when it plainly occurs on school grounds.,
29
One reason for this lack of consensus is that the First
Amendment does not categorically exclude harassing or
intimidating speech from its protections. Indeed, the Court has
made it clear that individuals must tolerate speech that
denigrates their racial or ethnic background or religious beliefs
if the expression falls short of [fighting words, obscenity, certain
types of defamatory speech, and true threats].30
In the public secondary school setting, courts have disagreed
about whether schools can prohibit speech that is not covered by
federal anti-discrimination law. For example, the Ninth Circuit held
in Harper v. Poway Unified School District that a school could restrict
anti-gay speech even if it is non-disruptive and not directed
specifically at another student. 1 On the other hand, the Third Circuit
struck down a similar anti-harassment policy as unconstitutionally
overbroad, holding instead that schools can restrict harassing speech
only when it satisfies Tinker v. Des Moines School District's
"substantial disruption" standard (as discussed infra in section I.A). 2
Weaving the Internet into the school regulation equation adds an
additional layer of complexity. The borderless, omnipresent nature
of the Internet defies geographical limits and blurs the traditional on-
campus off-campus threshold for school regulation of student
speech.33  Unlike traditional methods of disseminating speech, the
Internet is a boundless ubiquitous medium that allows for
instantaneous, continuous, and comprehensive distribution of one's
message. Amid rapid technological evolution, schools continue to
28. Renee L. Servance, Cyberbullying, Cyber-Harassment, and the Conflict Between
Schools and the First Amendment, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 1213, 1216-24 (2003).
29. Papandrea, supra note 27, at 1096.
30. Id. at 1096-97 (footnote omitted); see also Thomas E. Wheeler, Lessons from the
Lord of the Flies: The Responsibility of Schools to Protect Students from Internet Threats
and Cyber-Hate Speech, 215 EDUC. L. REP. 227, 234 (2007) (citing Boucher v. Bd. of Sch.
Dist. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821, 854 (7th Cir. 1998)).
31. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1171-78 (9th Cir. 2006),
vacated, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007).
32. See infra section I.A.; see also Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200,
217 (3rd Cir. 2001).
33. Servance, supra note 28, at 1214.
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struggle with balancing the rights of speakers against the rights of
others within the school community.'
Cyberbullying on the Internet by high school and middle school
students is a unique social harm, yet it is not addressed by any current
social reforms." Section I of this Note discusses the traditional
standards applied by school authorities when determining the scope
of student speech. Sections II and III illustrate how the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Morse v. Frederick has impacted and
fragmented subsequent lower court rulings in student speech cases.
In light of student use of the omnipresent and amorphous medium of
the Internet, Section IV discusses lower court interpretation and
application of the Morse decision and examines the courts' struggle to
reconcile the tension between respecting student free speech rights
and protecting other students' and administrators' individual rights.
Finally, Section V proposes two possible alternative approaches to
Morse to address the challenges presented by cyberbullying and
cyberharassment cases.
I. Traditional Student Speech Rights As Defined by the
Tinker-Fraser-Hazelwood Trilogy
School districts frequently seek to punish students under the
school discipline code for off-campus Internet speech. Once the
school district levies punishment, a student may seek the aid of courts
to vindicate her First Amendment rights through overturning the
punishment. In these lawsuits, courts typically apply the Tinker
standard of substantial and material disruption to the off-campus
Internet speech to determine whether or not the school district's
punishment was justified. Lower courts generally have not applied
the Court's subsequent rulings in Bethel School District v. Fraser and
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier to off-campus Internet
speech cases. This section provides an overview of the traditional
standards governing the scope of student speech and the reach of
school authority.
A. Tinker Standards
In Tinker v. Des Moines School District, the United States
Supreme Court created a distinction between expression taking place
off-campus and expression that occurs inside "the schoolhouse
34. Servance, supra note 28, at 1218.
35. Chaffin, supra note 2, at 776.
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gates."36 The Court held that the school district violated students'
free speech rights when it prohibited them from wearing black
armbands in protest of the Vietnam War.37  It set forth the
"substantial disruption test," which established that student speech
may be punished if it "materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others., 38 The Court
also found that First Amendment rights must be "applied in light of
the special characteristics of the school" and that undifferentiated
fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the
right to freedom of expression.39  Subsequent Supreme Court
decisions applied the "substantial disruption test" to on-campus
speech, but the Court has never specified the proper method of
evaluating off-campus student speech.
B. Fraser Standards
In Bethel School District v. Fraser, the Court expanded school
districts' ability to regulate student speech occurring during school-
sponsored activities and events on campus."0 Matthew Fraser, a junior
at a Washington State high school, delivered a speech laced with
sexual references before the student assembly."1 School officials
suspended Fraser for several days even though his speech caused no
actual disruption.42
In Fraser, the Court noted a "marked difference" between the
political speech in Tinker and what it termed Fraser's "sexual
speech., 43 The Court held that the First Amendment does not bar a
school from punishing a student's "lewd and inappropriate" speech
when delivered at a school assembly." Student expression
constituting lewd, vulgar, and offensive speech do not enjoy the
protection of the First Amendment.4' Additionally, the Court also
accorded less respect to student rights in general, writing that "the
constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically
36. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
37. Id. at 514.
38. Id. at 513.
39. Id. at 506.
40. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 676 (1986).
41. Id. at 675.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 680, 682.
44. Id. at 685.
45. Id. at 676.
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coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings."" Thus, the
Court established a balancing test, explaining that "the... freedom to
advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and
classrooms must be balanced against society's countervailing interest
in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate
behavior." 7 However, in alignment with Tinker, the Fraser Court
asserted that the same type of expression would not be punished if
spoken outside the schoolhouse gates.48
C. Hazelwood Standards
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, a high school
principal in Missouri objected to two student articles in the school
newspaper addressing teen pregnancy and the impact of divorce upon
teenagers. 49 Because the newspaper was produced as part of a high
school journalism class, the principal asserted that he had control
over the newspaper.0 Subsequently, he ordered the articles excised
from the newspaper, and several students sued, claiming a violation of
their First Amendment rights." The Supreme Court sided with the
school, recognizing that "[a] school need not tolerate student speech
that is inconsistent with its 'basic educational mission,' even though
the government could not censor similar speech outside the school."52
The Court created a distinction between school-sponsored and
incidental expression, holding that school administrators could censor
student writings from school-sponsored publications and activities as
long as the restriction is based on "legitimate pedagogical concerns.""
II. Morse v. Frederick: Expanding the Reach of School
Authority Beyond 'The Schoolhouse Gates'
Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood all involved speech that occurred
on-campus. However, the Supreme Court's most recent decision
concerning student speech failed to delineate a clear on/off-campus
46. Id. at 682.
47. Id. at 681.
48. Id. at 688.
49. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,260 (1988).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 266 (citation omitted).
53. Id. at 271-73.
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distinction for moderating student speech.- Unlike the cases before
it, Morse v. Frederick involved conduct that occurred away from
school premises.5
In Morse, a high school student from Juneau, Alaska, unfurled a
fourteen-foot banner across the street from the school emblazoned
with the words "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS. 5 6 The act occurred while the
2002 Olympic torch relay passed in front of the school 7 The student
argued that his case should not be analyzed within the traditional
school speech framework because his expressive conduct ostensibly
occurred off-campus at an event attended by the general public. The
Court rejected Frederick's argument and held that his conduct was
school speech occurring on-campus because the Olympic torch relay
event was a school-sponsored class trip during school hours, school
teachers and other administrators were supervising the students, and
Frederick unfurled his banner while standing amongst his fellow
students.5 9
In ruling on the case, the Supreme Court carved out new area of
unprotected student expression: speech advocating illegal drug use.'
In addition to creating this new exception restricting student speech
rights within the schoolhouse gates, the Court extended the
restriction beyond the school's physical boundaries.61 The majority
refused to read Fraser expansively to "encompass any speech that
could fit under some definition of 'offensive."' 62  In their joint
concurrence Justices Alito and Kennedy joined the majority opinion
only
on the understanding that (a) it goes no further than to hold
that public school may restrict speech that a reasonable
observer would interpret as advocating illegal drug use and (b)
it provides no support for any restriction of speech that can
plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or
54. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 400-04 (2007).
55. Id. at 400-01.
56. Id. at 397.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 397-400.
59. Id. at 400-01.
60. Id. at 396-97, 403-10.
61. Id.at 400-01.
62. Id. at 409.
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social issue, including speech on issues such as "the wisdom of
the war on drugs or of legalizing marijuana for medicinal use.
6 3
Justice Alito also noted that "in most cases, Tinker's 'substantial
disruption' standard permits school officials to step in before actual
violence erupts.""
HI. Controversial Lower Court Interpretations of the
Alito/Kennedy Concurrence in Morse
The following cases indicate that lower courts are willing to
extend the logic and reasoning of Morse to support the censorship of
student speech that either threatens physical violence or causes
emotional injury.6' These fragmented lower court interpretations
suggest that Morse did little to calm what one federal appellate court
called "the unsettled waters of free speech rights in public schools,
waters rife with rocky shoals and uncertain currents.,
66
Ponce v. Socorro Independent School District involved an
extended notebook diary, written in first-person perspective,
describing the creation of a pseudo-Nazi group at a high school.67 The
Fifth Circuit held that "a Morse analysis" is appropriate, rather than
the traditional, well-established, and more rigorous Tinker
"substantial disruption" standard when the student speech at issue
"threatens a Columbine-style attack on a school."' The court relied
on what it called "Justice Alito's concurring, and controlling,
opinion" in Morse to establish a very broad, pro-censorship principle
that "speech advocating a harm that is demonstrably grave and that
derives that gravity from the 'special danger' to the physical safety of
students arising from the school environment is unprotected." 69 The
court's decision extended application of Morse to include harm to
63. Id. at 422. (Alito, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 425 (emphasis added).
65. Clay Calvert, Misuse and Abuse of Morse v. Frederick by Lower Courts:
Stretching the High Court's Ruling Too Far to Censor Student Expression, 32 SEATrLE U.
L. REV. 1, 21-24 (Fall 2008).
66. Guiles ex rel. Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 321 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied,
551 U.S. 1162 (2007).
67. Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 766 (5th Cir. 2007).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 770.
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others, as opposed to mere harm to self, as implicated by Morse's
allowance of prohibiting speech advocating illegal drug use.7'
The Ninth Circuit, in Harper v. Poway Unified School District,
further extended the Court's holding in Morse.7' In Harper, Ponway
High School punished a student for wearing a T-shirt to school that
read "Be Ashamed, Our School Embraced What God Has
Condemned" on the front, and "Homosexuality Is Shameful 'Romans
1:27' on the back. In upholding the student's punishment, the
Ninth Circuit reasoned that Morse affirms that school officials have a
duty to protect students, as young as fourteen or fifteen years of age,
from degrading acts or expressions injurious to students' physical,
emotional, or psychological well-being and development which, in
turn, adversely impacts the school's educational mission.73 The court
relied on Morse to support its holding that restriction of speech by
school officials is proper if it is considered harmful and undermines
"the rights of other students."74 As such, the court found that the
expression was properly censored because students who were the
targets of the shirt's homophobic message suffered emotional
distress.75
The Seventh Circuit's holding in Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian
Prairie School District No. 204 likewise suggests that Morse can be
used to suppress speech that causes psychological harm.76 This case
involved a T-shirt emblazoned with the phrase "Be Happy, Not
Gay., 77 The court reasoned that the Morse holding encompassed the
psychological effects of speech, referencing the Morse Court's citation
of its prior opinion in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton that
"school years are the time when the physical, psychological, and
addictive effects of drugs are most severe. 78 Nuxoll is perhaps the
most dramatic indication of the way that lower courts are willing to
70. Calvert, supra note 65, at 15-17.
71. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1192 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated,
549 U.S. 1262 (2007).
72. Id. at 1171.
73. Id. at 1178-1184.
74. Id. at 1178-80.
75. Id.
76. Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 668, 674 (7th
Cir. 2008).
77. Id. at 670.
78. Id. at 674; Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 407 (2007) (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist.
47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661-62 (1995)) (emphasis added).
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broaden the traditional limitations set forth in Tinker based on their
perception and interpretation of the logic set forth by the Supreme
Court in Morse.
IV. Implications for Student Cyberspeech and Cyberbullying In
Light of Expansive Lower Court Interpretations of Morse
Reno v. ACLU was the first major Supreme Court ruling
regarding the regulation of materials distributed via the Internet.79 In
Reno, the Court voted to strike down provisions of the
Communications Decency Act and held that the Internet is a forum
fully protected by the First Amendment.' The basis for the Court's
decision in Reno was that restricting indecent speech on the Internet
to protect minors unconstitutionally infringed the free speech rights
of adults.81
The Supreme Court, however, has not addressed school officials'
authority to punish student speech involving the digital media. While
all of the Court's school speech cases involved speech occurring on
school grounds or during school-sponsored activities, the Court's
increasing deference to school administrators suggests that it is willing
to expand the ability of schools to regulate student speech, regardless
of the medium involved. 82 The Court has recognized that public
school students do not receive the same level of free expression rights
as adults in a general setting.83  In circumscribing students'
constitutional rights, the Court emphasized in Tinker that these rights
must be interpreted in light of the unique environment of the public
school.84 In his concurring opinion in Morse, Justice Alito likewise
acknowledged that "schools can be places of special danger" because
students "may be compelled on a daily basis to spend time at close
quarters with other students who may do them harm.,
85
Courts typically rely on the "substantial disruption" test
articulated in Tinker when addressing incidents of cyberbullying
originating from personal computers which affect students attending
79. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997).
80. Id. at 844, 874-79.
81. Id.
82. Morse, 551 U.S. at 433 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).
84. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
85. Morse, 551 U.S. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring).
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the public schools. 86 First, courts consider the threshold issue of
whether Internet speech originating on personal computers is "on-
campus" or "off-campus" speech.87  "When doing so, courts have
analogized these incidents to cases dealing with 'underground
newspapers' or other types of publications that were printed off-
campus but later made their way onto campus." ' "In some cases,
courts have [determined] that where there is a 'sufficient nexus
between the web site and the school campus,' the speech can be
considered 'on-campus."' 8 9 "[The] nexus [was] established in cases
where a student accessed a web site at school during class and...
where the web site content was aimed specifically at the school and
was carried by students onto campus." 9  Under the "substantial
disruption" standard, however, the majority of courts held that
cyberspeech created off-campus falls beyond the jurisdiction of school
disciplinary action.91
In a case where the court finds a sufficient nexus between speech
and the school campus, it will then examine whether the speech
substantially or materially disrupted the learning environment. 92
There is no precise test for what defines a "substantial disruption,"
but courts have reasoned that there must be more than some mild
86. Todd D. Erb, A Case for Strengthening School District Jurisdiction to Punish Off-
Campus Incidents of Cyberbullying, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 257, 263 (2008); see, e.g., J.S. ex rel.
H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 869 (Pa. 2002).
87. Erb, supra note 86, at 263; see, e.g., Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d
608, 615 (5th Cir. 2004); J.S., 807 A.2d at 865.
88. Erb, supra note 86, at 264; see, e.g., LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 983-
84, 989 (9th Cir. 2001); Boucher v. Sch. Bd. Of Sch. Dist. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821, 822-
23 (7th Cir. 1998); Sullivan v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 475 F.2d 1074-77 (5th Cir. 1973).
89. Erb, supra note 86, at 264; see J.S., 807 A.2d at 865 (determining whether a
sufficient nexus exists between off-campus speech and a school environment is based upon
the point of receipt, not necessarily transmission); see also Layshock v. Hermitage Sch.
Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 598 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (finding that the test for school authority is
not geographical and that the reach of school administrators is not strictly limited to the
school's physical property).
90. Erb, supra note 86, at 264; see, e.g., J.S., 807 A.2d at 852, 865 (illustrating a time
when students and administrators accessed a website at school); Beussink ex rel. Beussink
v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177-80 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (using the
Tinker standard for on-campus speech when students and teachers access the website on
school computers, but ruling that the website did not cause a substantial disturbance).
91. Erb, supra note 86, at 265; see, e.g., Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp.
2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
92. Erb, supra note 86, at 266; see, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 513-14 (1969); Boucher, 134 F.3d at 827-28.
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distraction or curiosity created by the speech,9 while "complete chaos
is not required." 94
In determining the magnitude of disruption, courts consider
factors such as: the reaction of the students and teachers to the
speech,95 whether any students or teachers had to take time off
from school because of the speech, 96 whether teachers were
incapable of controlling their classes because of the speech, 97
whether classes were cancelled,9  and how quickly the
administration responded to the speech. 99
"If the court.., finds that the Internet speech actually disrupted
or foreseeably could have disrupted the school's learning
environment, the administration's disciplinary measures [are
generally] upheld."' °
The following cases illustrate the way in which the concept of
what constitutes "on-campus" and "off-campus" activities has evolved
given growing concern about cyberbullying, and how this concern has
been juxtaposed with expansive interpretations of the reach of school
authority after Morse. In a world of rapid technological development,
adolescent adeptness in navigating cyberspace, and the Supreme
Court's ruling in Morse, lower courts continue to struggle with how to
reconcile new technological mediums, traditional standards, and the
potentially devastating impact of cyberbullying and cyberharassment.
A. The 'Sufficient Nexus and Specific Audience' Approach
In J.S. ex rel H.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the school's decision to expel a
93. Erb, supra note 86, at 266.; see Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 748-49 (5th Cir.
1996).
94. Erb, supra note 86, at 266; see J.S., 807 A.2d at 868.
95. J.S., 807 A.2d at 869.
96. Id; see also Killion v. Franklin Reg'l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446,455 (W.D. Pa. 2001).
97. Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 455.
98. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 600 (W.D. Pa. 2007).
99. Id.; see also J.S., 807 A.2d at 869.
100. Erb, supra note 86, at 266 ; see, e.g., Wisnieski ex rel. Wisnieski v. Bd. of Educ. of
Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 38-40 (2d Cir. 2007) (upholding school
disciplinary measures because it was reasonably foreseeable that the student's conduct
would "disrupt the work and discipline of the school"); Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., 686
F. Supp. 1387, 1390, 1392 (D. Minn. 1987) (finding that an underground publication that
contained vulgar language and advocated violence against teachers substantially disrupted
school operations because teachers "found it necessary to quell these disruptions").
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student for a website he created entitled "Teacher Sux."'O' The
website portrayed a teacher as Hitler, solicited funds for a hit man
under the caption "Why Should She Die," and included pictures of
the teacher's severed head dripping blood. °2 When the teacher
viewed the website, she became very distressed, as manifested by the
onset of physical illness. '°3 Because she was so emotionally distraught
due to the website's contents, the teacher was unable to finish the
school year.104
The court held that speech will be considered on-campus speech
where there is a "sufficient nexus between the web site and the school
campus to consider the speech as occurring on-campus...
Importantly, the website was aimed not at a random audience, but at
the specific audience of students and other connected with this
particular School District."'' 5 Specifically, the court held that "where
speech that is aimed at a specific school and/or its personnel is
brought onto school campus or accessed at school by its originator,
the speech will be considered on-campus speech."' '6 Applying this
rule, the court concluded that the student's website was on-campus
speech even though he created it off-campus because he accessed the
website at school, showed it to another student, and told other
students about it."1
7
The court found that the student's expulsion fit within the
punishment allowed by the Court's Fraser framework of discipline
"for speech that undermines the basic function of a public school."' 8
Applying Tinker, the court also found that the website caused a
material and substantial disruption at the school." Accordingly, the
court found in favor of the school administrators and upheld the
expulsion of the student for posting the derogatory and threatening
comments on his website." The significance of this case is that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court acknowledged the authority of school
administrators to discipline a student for Internet speech; however,
101. J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 851 (Pa. 2002).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 852.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 865.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 868.
109. Id. at 869.
110. Id.
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the court first had to find that the speech was considered "on-
campus."''.
In contrast to J.S., the court in Layshock v. Hermitage School
District granted summary judgment in favor of a student who claimed
the school violated his First Amendment rights by punishing him for
creating an unflattering mock profile of his principal on
MySpace.com, which suggested that the principal had alcohol abuse
problems and labeled him as a "big fag," "big steroid freak," and "big
whore.""' Layshock mentioned the profile to just a few classmates,
but word of the computer profile spread through the student body."3
Students began viewing the profile so frequently that the school
found it necessary to shut down student access to the computer
system for five days."' The court, however, found that disruption
insufficient to meet the Tinker standard because "no classes were
cancelled, no widespread disorder occurred, [and] there was no
violence or student disciplinary action. '
B. The 'Reasonably Foreseeable' Approach Combined with the Tinker
Test
Two controversial decisions of the Second Circuit, Wisniewski v.
Board of Education and Doninger v. Niehoff, directly invoked Morse
and grappled with crafting the appropriate regulatory standard to
apply in instances of administrative cyberharassment. The
Wisniewski court upheld a suspension based on the student's creation
of an icon depicting a pistol firing a bullet at a person's head and the
words "Kill Mr. VanderMolen" attached to the instant messages that
he sent his friends."' The Second Circuit emphasized that "[t]he fact
that [the student]'s creation and transmission of the IM icon occurred
away from school property does not necessarily insulate him from
school discipline."" 7  The icon appeared only in private
communications Wisniewski sent to his friends, he did not use a
school computer to send these communications, and the icon came to
the school's attention only weeks later when another student, who
111. Id. at 864.
112. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 591 (W.D. Pa. 2007).
113. Id. at 591.
114. Id. at 592.
115. Id. at 600.
116. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.
1741 (2008).
117. Id. at 39.
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had not received an email from Wisniewski himself, told the teacher
about it.
118
The court justified its holding by reasoning it was "reasonably
foreseeable" that the icon would come to the attention of the school
authorities and would "materially and substantially disrupt the work
and discipline of the school."''. The icon disrupted school operations
because it diverted the attention of school officials, required the
replacement of the threatened teacher (who refused to teach
Wisniewski), and required officials to interview students during class
time.120 Given these factors, the court ruled that it was irrelevant
whether the student's icon constituted a "true threat" because "we
think that school officials have significantly broader authority to
sanction student speech than the [Fraser "true threat"] standard
allows.'
121
In determining what standard should be used to review the case,
the court stated that where a "student's expression [is] reasonably
understood as urging violent conduct, we think the appropriate First
Amendment standard is the one set forth by the Supreme Court in
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.'
22
Because of the violent nature of the icon, the court applied the Tinker
standard due to "[t]he fact that [the student's] creation and
transmission of the IM icon occurred away from school property does
not necessarily insulate him from school discipline.'
' 23
In determining that the speech was not automatically outside of
the school's jurisdiction, the court noted the Supreme Court's
decision in Morse, and the lack of clarification provided therein with
respect to the reach of a school's authority to discipline students for
off-campus speech. 4 Specifically, the Second Circuit stated:
Since the Supreme Court in Morse rejected the claim that the
student's location, standing across the street from the school at
a school approved event with a banner visible to most students,
was not 'at school,' it had no occasion to consider the
118. Id. at 36.
119. Id. at 38-39.
120. Id. at 36.
121. Id. at 37-38.
122. Id. at 38.
123. Id. at 39.
124. Id.
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circumstances under which the school authorities may discipline
students for off-campus activities. ' 2'
The court went on to conclude that the "substantial disruption"
test of Tinker was met because "it was reasonably foreseeable that the
IM icon would come to the attention of school authorities and the
teacher whom the icon depicted being shot," and there was "no doubt
that the icon, once made known to the teacher and other school
officials, would foreseeably create a risk of substantial disruption
within the school environment.'
2 6
The United States District Court in Connecticut, and
subsequently the Second Circuit followed the Wisniewski decision in
Doninger v. Niehoff, upholding the punishment of a student who
called the school principal a "douchebag" on her social networking
website .1 7 Doninger v. Niehoff involved a disagreement concerning a
"battle of the bands" concert.'28  After learning that school
administrators were likely to postpone the concert, Avery Doninger
collaborated with some of her classmates to raise awareness of the
postponement and to pressure the school administrators to rethink
the schedule. 9 One of Doninger's pressure tactics was to post an
entry to her LiveJournal blog in which she referred to the school
administrators as "douchebags" and encouraged others to contact the
school principal to "piss her off" more.30 In turn, the school
disqualified her from running for Senior Class Secretary and from
speaking at graduation because the administration concluded that her
conduct "failed to display the civility and good citizenship expected of
class officers.'
13 1
The District Court rejected Doninger's First Amendment
challenge, and the Second Circuit affirmed.32 Significantly, the court
acknowledged that the case was unique in that it did not deal with
content created at school or under the auspices of the classroom, but
rather was created on Doninger's personal time, outside of school,
125. Id. at 39 n.3 (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007)).
126. Id. at 39- 40.
127. Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199,202, 206 (D. Conn. 2007).
128. Id. at 203-04.
129. Id. at 203.
130. Id. at 206.
131. Id. at 202; Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 43 (2d Cir. 2008).
132. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 54.
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and on her own computer .' But the "off-campus character" of the
posting did "not necessarily insulate [Doninger] from schooldiscipline."'34
The court found it was reasonably foreseeable that Doninger's
post would reach school property because the content directly
pertained to school events, its intent was to get students to read and
respond, and Doninger knew school community members were likely
to read the post.' Moreover, on the point of "substantial
disruption," the court found that the post contained offensive
language, was misleading, and did not comport with the standard of
conduct expected of a school government participant.'36 The Second
Circuit's decisions in Wisniewski and Doninger demonstrate the lower
court's willingness to extend the reach of school authority beyond
"the schoolhouse gates" in student Internet speech cases. However,
the divergent standards and varying outcomes in other cases highlight
the need for a more uniform and predictable standard for student
speech in this new context.
V. Streamlining Lower Court Confusion and Inconsistency:
Two Alternative Solutions to Assessing Cyberbullying and
Cyberharrassment
As evidenced by the lower court splintering regarding cyberbully
regulation post-Morse, courts must define a more concrete approach
to the conundrum of applying the traditional free speech framework
to the amorphous virtual world of cyberbullying. Rather than stretch
the Court's holding in Morse in an attempt to deter this behavior, I
propose two alternative solutions in this section that the courts might
consider applying instead. One possible solution is for courts to
determine that cyberbullying and cyberharassment are not "speech"
within the definition of the First Amendment. Flowing from the
Court's refusal to afford certain expression First Amendment
protection, these harmful actions should not be constitutionally
protected because they provide little value to society and can cause
great injury to others. In the alternative, I propose that if courts
continue to find that cyberbullying constitutes "speech" within the
definition of the First Amendment, they should consider applying the
133. Id. at 49-50.
134. Doninger, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 216.
135. Id. at 217.
136. Id.
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Tinker standard to these cases with a more nuanced application of the
second prong of the test, which calls for consideration of the speech's
"invasion of the rights of others." '137
A. Determining That Cyberbullying Is Not 'Speech' Within the
Definition of the First Amendment
Granting minors free speech rights promotes the principles
animating the right to free speech under the First Amendment: (1)
the promotion of democratic self-government,3 ' (2) the search for
truth in the marketplace of ideas,'39 and (3) the fostering of autonomy
and self-fulfillment.4 0 All three ideas justify robust free speech rights
for adolescents.14' However, the Supreme Court has opined that "not
all speech is of equal First Amendment importance', 4 2 because some
speech does not serve the purposes of the First Amendment. The
Court's dictum in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire presents the idea
that free speech protection of words with low social value may be
"outweighed" by the social interest in preventing the harm they
cause.'43 Low value speech is not afforded the protections of the First
Amendment because it does not further the reasons for providing
protection in the first place." Thus, the First Amendment should not
immunize cyberbullies who use words to invade the rights of others.'
1. Traditional Categories of Unprotected Speech and Application to
Student Speech
Although the First Amendment guarantees free speech, the right
is not absolute.'46 Governments impose limitations on many types of
speech, including fighting words47 false statements of fact, 48 and
137. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
138. KEVIN W. SAUNDERS, SAVING OUR CHILDREN FROM THE FIRST AMENDMENT
21(2003).
139. DAVID MOSHMAN, CHILDREN, EDUCATION, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 25 (1989).
140. Id. at 25.
141. SAUNDERS, supra note 138, at 23.
142. Dun Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 (1985).
143. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
144. Id.
145. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
146. Id. at 521-22.
147. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
148. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280-81 (1964).
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obscene speech.14 9  Moreover, courts distinguish between
constitutionally protected speech and other less socially valuable
categories of speech.' Other examples of unprotected speech
include speech that incites others to engage in lawless behavior... and
that which constitutes "true threats.,
152
Since the Columbine High School Massacre in 1999 which left
twelve students and one teacher dead,'53 almost no school has
tolerated student speech containing even the slightest reference to, or
depiction of, violence.' Characterizing student speech as a "true
threat" is a threshold issue; speech falling into this category merits no
protection, and analysis under Tinker, Fraser, and/or Hazelwood is
unnecessary.' The Supreme Court addressed "true threats" in Watts
v. United States,' and subsequent holdings in lower courts have
developed a number of tests for determining whether speech
constitutes a "true threat." These tests consider various factors, such
as intention of the speaker, the reaction of a reasonable recipient,5 '
and whether the speech was conditional. " 9
149. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
150. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (holding that child pornography
is unprotected by the First Amendment); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50
(1976) (finding that materials shown in adult movie theaters to be "low value speech"
more susceptible to government regulation); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560
(1991) (finding nude dancing to be low value speech and holding that the state has the
constitutional authority to regulate this form of expression because it furthers a substantial
government interest in protecting the morality and order of society).
151. Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 444-47 (1969).
152. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 705-07 (1969); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 388 (1992).
153. Evelyn Nieves, Terror in Littleton: The Mourning; Long Week of Funerals Finally
Comes to an End, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1999, at A26.
154. See, e.g., LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding that
the expulsion of a student who brought his teacher a poem he had written entitled "Last
Words" that depicted the shooting of fellow students); Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., 686
F. Supp. 1387 (D. Minn. 1987) (permitting a school to punish students who distributed on
campus an underground newspaper that advocated violence against teachers).
155. Kara D. Williams, Comment and Casenote, Public Schools vs. MySpace &
Facebook: The Newest Challenge to Student Speech Rights, 76 U. Cin. L. Rev. 707, 711 (2008).
156. Watts, 394 U.S. at 705-06.
157. U.S. v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1990).
158. Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 623 (8th Cir. 2002).
159. United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1026-27 (2d Cir. 1976).
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2. Cyberbullying Should Not Be Afforded First Amendment Protection
Cyberbullying does not fit squarely within any of the traditional
categories of unprotected speech. However, the underlying harm
stemming from such speech is analogous to that of speech which is
not constitutionally protected. While true threats and other forms of
traditionally unprotected speech may be punished under basic First
Amendment principles, bullying is not always so overt. For example,
sexually explicit gossip is a pervasive and damaging form of
cyberbullying, but it cannot neatly be characterized as a "true threat."
Websites consisting of detailed personal information about female
classmates, including their phone numbers, addresses, and accounts of
their sexual exploits are harmful and provide no social value.' °
Several national sites, such as Slambook.com have been created
where students can post vicious, obscene, and often threatening
questions online for others to answer and read. 6' On a similar site
entitled Schoolrumors.com, students can post graphic messages full of
sexual innuendo aimed at individual students and focusing on such
topics as the "weirdest people at your school." '162
These bullying tactics serve only to silence, intimidate, and inflict
pain on other students and do not encourage any reasoned
deliberation about "truth" on which a community can agree.163
Moreover, cyberbullying silences the victims, denying them any
benefit of speech."6  Grouping cyberbullying into a category of
"political" or "academic" speech is also illogical. It is difficult to
argue that websites allowing students to vote on "Who's the biggest
slut in school" will substantially "diminish the marketplace of ideas."
The recent tragedy of Megan Meier catapulted the gravity of
cyberbullying into the national spotlight.'65 In 2006, thirteen-year-old
Megan Meier met a teenage boy named Josh Evans on the social
160. Student Press Law Center, District Attorney Will Not Prosecute Students for
Posting Sexual Rumors on Website (June 13, 2001), available at http://www.splc.org/
newsflash.asp?id=292.
161. Kathryn Balint et al., Personal Fouls: Students Get Rude and Crude with Internet
Slambooks, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 3, 2001, at El.
162. Sandy Banks, Website Where Students Slung Vicious Gossip is Shut Down, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 2001, at Al.
163. Stacy M. Chaffin, Comment, The New Playground Bullies of Cyberspace: Online
Peer Sexual Harassment, 51 How. L.J. 773, 802 (Spring 2008).
164. Id. at 804.
165. Christopher Maag, A Hoax Turned Fatal Draws Anger but No Charges, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 28,2007, at A23, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/28/us/28hoax.html
(last visited February 7, 2010).
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networking website MySpace.'6 The two had an amicable
relationship until Josh began making derogatory comments to Megan,
such as "the world would be a better place without you."'67 Later that
night, Megan's mother found her hanging from her closet, and she
died the next day."6  Six weeks after Megan's death, her parents
discovered that "Josh" was actually a collective creation of Lori
Drew, Drew's teenage daughter, and Ashley Grills, a part-time
employee.6 9 Lori Drew was the mother of one of Megan's friends
who lived four houses away from the Meiers, and who created the
alias "Josh" to find out how Megan felt about her daughter. 170 In this
case, "Josh's" words posed a very real danger to Megan-the precise
concern that played a central role in the Court's analysis in Morse.
171
But even if this kind of bullying would be "inappropriate" in a school
setting, it cannot be punished because it did not take place "on
campus."
The Court in Morse recognized vulnerabilities in school-aged
children relating to drug-use, noting that "[s]chool years are a time
when the physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs are
most severe" and recognizing an "important [and] perhaps
compelling" public interest in deterring drug use.172 An analogy can
be drawn between the harmful effects of cyberbullying and
cyberharassment. This analogy provides justification for an
additional exception placing harmful cyberspeech outside the First
Amendment's protective circle. 7 1 An argument that such speech
should not be afforded First Amendment protection is further
underscored and supported by the Court's prior statement in
Hazelwood that "[a] school must.., retain the authority to refuse to
sponsor student speech that might reasonably be perceived to
166. Maag, supra note 165; see also Steve Pokin, Pokin Around: A Real Person, A Real
Death, ST. CHARLES JOURNAL, Nov. 10, 2007, available at http://stcharlesjournal.stltoday
.com/articles/2007/11/10/news/sj2tn2O7lllO-llllstc-pokinl.iil.txt.




171. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 422 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring).
172. Id. at 12.
173. Sarah Cronan, Note, Grounding Cyberspeech: Public Schools' Authority to
Discipline Students for Internet Activity, 97 Ky. L.J. 149, 168 (2008).
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advocate drug or alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or conduct otherwise
inconsistent with 'the shared values of a civilized social order.'
174
B. An Alternative Solution to Cyberbully Regulation: Revisiting and
Reexamining the Tinker Standard
Alternatively, if courts determine that cyberbullying is, in fact,
speech protected by the First Amendment, they should re-examine
and apply the test set forth in Tinker instead of straining to apply and
extend the narrow and somewhat convoluted opinions in Morse.
Given the proliferation of online student interaction and the unique
pervasive modality of the Internet, old distinctions physically
demarcating authority over student speech to "on" or "off" campus
inadequately address and oversimplify the issue. However, a more
careful and nuanced application of the Tinker test might adequately
address the challenges presented by cyberbullying and
cyberharassment cases.
The overall tone of Tinker strongly respects the expressive rights
of students outside of the special context of the school environment.
175
The Tinker Court stressed the importance of exposing future leaders
to a
robust exchange of ideas.' ' 176 However, the Court also stated
that "conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any
reason... materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not
immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech.77
In the cases involving cyberspeech discussed in this Note, lower
courts typically applied Tinker's "substantial disruption test" to
determine whether the action fell within the school's ambit of
authority. In Harper, however, the Ninth Circuit breathed new life
into the "invasion of the rights of others" prong of Tinker by holding
that a high school student could be prohibited from wearing a t-shirt
stating "HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL" because it
174. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988) (citing Bethel Sch.
Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)).
175. Anne Profitt Dupre, Should Students Have Constitutional Rights? Keeping Order
in the Public Schools, 65 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 49 (1996).
176. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) (citing
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
177. Id. at 513 (emphasis added).
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"undermined the rights of other students.' 78  Unlike the "silent,
passive" armbands at issue in Tinker, the court found the anti-gay T-
shirt "'collid[ed] with the rights of other students' in the most
fundamental way"'79 because it targeted students of a minority group
and could cause psychological damage and interfere with their right
to learn."° This decision suggests that Tinker's "interference with the
rights of others" standard might become significant, particularly in
the context of harassing or demeaning speech.18' However, the speed
with which the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Harper suggests that the Court was not anxious to take that question
up itself, or to permit the broad language of the Ninth Circuit's
opinion to serve as precedent for other courts.
Applied in its entirety, the two-pronged Tinker test can
potentially address the delicate balance of rights presented by
cyberbullying and cyberharassment cases. The nexus between the
school and the student speech at issue required by the "substantial
disturbance" prong provides a check against abuse and overreach of
school authority. The second prong's mechanism for regulation of
speech resulting in the "invasion of the rights of others" ensures
protection of the rights of students to be secure in the school
environment. Taken together, the two prongs provide protection for
student speech rights and individual rights, and do not require clever
conceptual leaps and linkage of logic, as does the application of
Morse. As such, courts might consider revisiting the nuances of the
Tinker test in future application.
Conclusion
While schools must not become "enclaves of totalitarianism,""
they must not be powerless to confront harassers either. Ever-
increasing evidence reveals the negative effects of peer harassment on
the school community and the resulting disruption.'83 Victimized
students may avoid school and suffer emotional harm, and they may
178. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1171, 1177-78 (9th Cir. 2006),
vacated, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007).
179. Id. at 1178.
180. Id. at 1178-79.
181. Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV.
1027, 1042 (2008).
182. Renee L. Servance, Cyberbullying, Cyber-Harassment, and the Conflict Between
Schools and the First Amendment, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 1213, 1237 (2003).
183. Id.
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not be able to participate fully in their education as a result of such
bullying. Moreover, given the pervasive and omnipresent nature of
the Internet, it is impractical to rely on traditional, bright-line
geographical boundaries to determine the reach of authority.
"Because the internet offers a far more powerful vehicle for
harassment than traditional methods of speech, the invasion of the
rights of the targeted individual is more potent."'8' The Constitution
guarantees freedom of speech, but it should not be a license for
students to personally attack school administrators and fellow
students. The unpredictability and splintering of lower court
decisions post-Morse indicates the need for a more clearly defined
uniform standard to apply to student Internet speech if courts
continue to uphold that cyberbullying is speech that should be
afforded First Amendment protection. Applying the traditional
Tinker test in a way that more closely considers the speech's
"invasion of rights of others" while ensuring a sufficient nexus
between that speech and the school through "substantial disruption"
prong potentially strikes the most appropriate balance between a
student's freedom of expression and "the right and responsibility of a
public school to maintain an environment conducive to learning." '185
184. Id. at 1244.
185. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 595,602 (W.D. Pa. 2007).
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